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Abstract
Americans work more than Europeans. Using micro data from the U.S. and 17 European countries,
we document that women are typically the largest contributors to the cross-country differences in
work hours. We also show that there is a negative relation between taxes and annual hours worked,
driven by men, and a positive relation between divorce rates and annual hours worked, driven by
women. In a calibrated life-cycle model with heterogeneous agents, marriage and divorce we find
that the divorce and tax mechanisms together can explain 45% of the variation in labor supply
between the U.S. and the European countries.
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1. Introduction
It is a well-known empirical finding that aggregate hours worked are higher in the United
States than in Europe and that there is also substantial variation among European countries; see
for instance Prescott (2004) and Rogerson (2006). These differences deserve attention: Rogerson
(2006) notes that they are an order of magnitude larger than the fluctuations at business cycle
frequencies in post-WWII U.S. data. Are the differences in hours worked due to public policies or
are they due to other fundamental differences between societies?
This paper has two contributions: first, it documents, using cross-country data, that there is a
negative relation between taxes and annual hours worked and a positive relation between divorce
rate and annual hours worked. While the first relation is well-known, the second one is new, at
least from a cross-country perspective. Furthermore, this paper shows that the negative relation
between taxes and hours is driven by the behavior of men (i.e. for women the correlation between
taxes and hours is close to zero) and the positive relation between divorce and hours is driven by
the behavior of women (i.e. for men the correlation between divorce and hours is close to zero).
Second, motivated by these two facts, this paper builds a life cycle model economy populated
by heterogenous agents in which both taxes and marital instability affect hours of work. In the
model economy, the marital transitions are exogenous, but given these exogenous transitions agents
adjust their labor supply and savings behavior. An important assumption is that the labor force
participation is associated with higher future earnings, as agents accumulate experience. The model
is then calibrated to the U.S. and is used to evaluate how much cross-country differences in taxes
and marriage and divorce rates can account for cross-country differences in hours worked. To
this end, we use the calibrated economy and change taxes and/or marriage and divorce rates. The
results show that taxes play an important role for differences for male hours, while differences in
marriage and divorce explain differences in female hours.
We begin by using micro level data to document the contribution of various demographic
groups to the aggregate differences in hours worked between the U.S. and 17 European coun-
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tries (Western Europe, except Iceland and Lichtenstein).1 We divide the populations into 12 demo-
graphic groups, by age, gender and marital status, and find that the largest contribution comes from
prime-aged women. In most European countries, women work substantially less than in the United
States while the difference in hours worked between European and American men is smaller.2 This
is especially true for married women, but also holds for single women, and for women with and
without children. Next, we document the main motivation for this paper: a negative cross-country
correlation between tax levels and hours worked, and a positive correlation between divorce rates
and hours worked across countries. However, taxes are in particular correlated with male work
hours, while divorce rates are in particular correlated with female work hours.
Why should divorce rates affect labor supply? The value of marriage as consumption insurance
has been pointed out in the literature.3 This paper argues that a higher probability of divorce affects
labor supply by reducing the expected value of insurance provided by marriage. In response,
individuals self-insure by investing in experience accumulation in the labor market. The argument
also applies to individuals who have not yet married. Thus, differences in divorce rates can help
explain cross-country differences in labor supply.
To quantitatively assess the impact of taxes and marriage stability on labor supply, we develop a
life-cycle, overlapping-generations model with heterogeneous agents, marriage and divorce. There
are three types of households: single men, single women and married couples. Divorces and mar-
riages occur stochastically.4 We calibrate our model to U.S. data and study how labor supply in
the U.S. changes as we introduce divorce and marriage probabilities and tax systems from other
countries. We find that making marriages more stable results in a reduction of labor supply, par-
1The selection of countries is due to data availability.
2The Nordic countries are an exception.
3See for instance Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) who study the gains from marriage due to risk sharing. Johnson and
Skinner (1986) and Stevenson (2008) have shown that divorce rates have significant effects on female labor supply.
4Two recent papers also making the assumption of exogenous divorce and marriage rates are Cubeddu and Rios-
Rull (2003) and Ferna´ndez and Wong (2013). This is reasonable because literature has shown that cultural, legal and
birth control factors play an important role for cross-country differences in divorce and marriage rates (See Johnson
and Skinner (1986), Goldin and Katz (2002), Crouch and Beaulieu (2006), Stevenson (2008), McDermott, Fowler, and
Christakis (2009), Gonzalez and Viitanen (2009) and Furtado, Marcen, and Sevilla-Sanz (2010), Kennes and Knowles
(2012) among others).
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ticularly for women. This is because women are usually the second earners in a married couple.
The insurance effect of marriage is therefore stronger for women, and female labor supply is more
sensitive to divorce and marriage rates.
When treated with both divorce and marriage probabilities and tax systems from the European
countries at the same time, the model can explain 45% of the variation in aggregate labor supply
between the U.S. and the European countries. Changing only the probabilities of marriage and
divorce in the U.S. to their European equivalents accounts for 17% of the cross-country differences
in aggregate hours worked. When we only introduce European taxes, we can account for 32% of
the variation in aggregate hours worked between the U.S. and the European countries. For female
labor supply, marriage stability explains 22% of the variation in work hours. However, taxes are
unable to explain any variation in female labor supply. Taxes are on the other hand very good
predictors of male labor supply. For men, taxes explain 71% of the variation between the U.S. and
the 17 European countries compared to 9% explained by divorce and marriage rates. In Section
6 we relate the differential impact of taxation on male and female labor supply to the fact that
countries with high tax average levels also tend to have progressive taxes and separate taxation of
married couples.
There is a substantial literature devoted to the rise in female work hours in the US over time.
The same explanations may be important from a cross country perspective. Divorce rates have
been shown to have a significant effect on female labor supply (see Johnson and Skinner (1986)
and Stevenson (2008)). In a contemporary paper which is closely related to ours, Ferna´ndez and
Wong (2013) find that divorce rates can help explain the rise in female labor force participation
over time in the U.S. Building a life-cycle model and treating it with exogenous divorce and mar-
riage rates the authors can explain a significant fraction of the increase in labor force participation
of married women in the 1955 cohort compared to the 1935 cohort. The rest is explained by
changes in wage structure. Kaygusuz (2010) finds that 20-24 percent of the 13 percentage points
rise in labor force participation of U.S. married women between 1980 to 1990 can be explained by
changes in taxes. In another related contemporary paper by Guvenen and Rendall (2013), women
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can achieve insurance against a bad marriage through education. Guvenen and Rendall (2013) are
able to explain the rise in divorce and decline in marriage rates in U.S. using their framework. At-
tanasio, Low, and Sanchez-Marcos (2008) look at the life-cycle labor supply of American women
born in the 30s, 40s and 50s and find that a combination of a reduction in the cost of children
alongside a reduction in the wage-gender gap is needed to explain the increase in participation of
the youngest cohort. Jones, Manuelli, and McGrattan (2003) study the increase in labor supply of
married women in U.S. between 1950-1990 and find that the gender wage gap plays an important
role, while technological improvements in the household have limited impact on the increase in
labor supply by married women. On the other hand, Greenwood, Seshadri, and Yorukoglu (2005)
find that new household technologies can help explain the rise in married female labor force par-
ticipation. Fernan´dez, Fogli, and Olivetti (2004) argues that changes in characteristics of men -
whose mothers have worked themselves - helps explain the labor participation decisions of their
wives.
A contemporary paper which is related to ours, and which also investigates the relationship
between taxes and labor supply across countries, is Bick and Fuchs-Schundeln (2014). Using a
static model with two-person households, they concentrate on the labor supply of married couples.
The authors find that the introduction of European tax systems in the U.S. does a good job of
explaining differences in married male work hours and for countries, which like the U.S. practice
joint taxation5, it also helps to explain differences in female work hours. For countries who practice
a higher degree of separate taxation of married couples, taxes explain less of the differences in
female labor supply. The reason is that some of the countries with relatively high average tax rate
practice separate taxation and in addition have very progressive tax schedules. The tax rate on the
secondary earner (usually the female) is therefore not necessarily that different from in the U.S.
This is similar to what we find in Section 6.3.
Other mechanisms that may affect differences in work hours across countries have also been
investigated in the literature. In particular, Rendall (2011) investigates differential productivity
5Germany and Belgium would be examples of such countries.
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across sectors, Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote (2005) suggests regulations and unionization, Wal-
lenius (2012) considers social security systems and resulting redistributive effects and Olivetti
(2006) looks at the role of returns to experience. We partially capture the redistributive effects in
our model, but due to data limitations are unable to capture country specific gender wage gaps,
returns to labor market experience, and unionization effects. These mechanisms could also con-
tribute to explaining cross-country differences in work hours. While we do not expect that our two
mechanisms can explain all of the cross-country variation in hours, in Section 6 we find that they
explain a substantial fraction (45% ).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we study the contributions
of different demographic groups to aggregate differences in labor supply between the U.S. and 17
Western European countries. In Section 3, we document a correlation between aggregate labor
supply and taxation across countries and a correlation between aggregate labor supply and divorce
rates across geographic regions. Section 4 develops the quantitative model. Section 5 discusses
data and calibration. Section 6 studies the quantitative implications of changing the U.S. divorce
and marriage probabilities to their European counterparts, and quantitative implications of intro-
ducing European tax schemes in the U.S. Section 7 concludes.
2. Labor Supply in the U.S. and Europe
2.1. Data Description
To obtain information about annual hours worked, we use two sources of micro data – the Euro-
pean Union Labor Force Survey database (E.U. LFS), which contains data from the 17 European
countries in our sample, and the Current Population Survey (CPS), which contains the correspond-
ing data from the U.S. Both of these datasets are used by the OECD to construct their macro-level
labor market statistics. We use data from 2000 for all countries except Germany, for which E.U.
LFS data is only available from 2002.
Similar to Prescott (2004), we consider individuals between 15 and 64 years of age. We con-
struct the data on annual hours worked as the product of hours worked per week and the number
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of weeks worked per year.6 We provide further details and discuss some existing issues with the
data in Appendix A.7
2.2. Labor Supply Across Countries
Column (2) in Table 1 shows that when taking a simple average across all European countries in
our sample, in the year 2000 European hours worked were 81.70% of (or about 249 hours less
than) those in the U.S. At the same time, there is a substantial variation within Europe. The annual
hours worked in Switzerland were quite close to those in the U.S., while in Belgium they were
only 69.18% of (or more than 400 hours lower than) those in the U.S.
Columns (3) and (4) in Table 1 show cross-country differences in hours worked for men and
women separately. On average, the difference for women is about 45 percent larger than for men.
However, the average masks a large variation within Europe. We divide the European countries
in our sample in three subgroups: Nordic countries, Central Europe and Southern Europe.8 In the
Nordic countries, the difference from the U.S. is in fact larger for men, while in a typical Southern
European country (with the only exception of Portugal), the difference for women is about two to
three times larger than the corresponding difference for men.
Columns (5-8) in Table 1 compare the average annual hours worked by marital status. Among
the four gender/marital status groups shown in the table (married men, single men, married women
and single women), married women in Europe display the largest difference from their U.S. coun-
terparts. However, this is largely due to the behavior of married women in Central and Southern
European countries. In Nordic countries, married women work almost as many hours as those in
the U.S. Single women in Europe also work substantially less compared to their U.S. counterparts,
and the difference is again particularly large in Southern Europe.
We use legal marital status in our analysis. Cohabitation is an important issue. However, data
6Hours worked per week correspond to the hours worked in all jobs in the reference week of the interview.
7Internet supplement is available at https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/19751944/ms/ia.pdf.
8We put Ireland in the “Southern” European group, since it resembles those countries along two important dimen-
sions: marriage stability and labor supply of women. It might be more appropriate to call this group of countries
“Catholic”.
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is mostly unavailable regarding cohabiting couples. Eurostat database that we use to compute the
marriage and divorce probabilities provides data on persons in registered partnership for only four
countries in our sample: the Netherlands, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, starting from 2007. In
Appendix B, we discuss the impact of cohabitation on these four countries in some detail. The
impact of cohabitation for the four countries seems limited. However, more research using more
data is necessary before a conclusion can be reached. At the same time, we believe that people
that are legally married and those that only cohabit differ along the dimensions (such as separation
costs, tax schedule) that are mainly relevant for this paper. The existing research on this matter
appears to support this view. (See, for example, Gemici and Laufer (2010)).9
Columns (9-14) in Table 1 contrasts the cross-country differences in hours worked by gender
and three age groups: (i) “young” (16-24 years of age), (ii) “prime-aged” (25-54 years of age) and
(iii) “old” (55-64 years of age). As before, for each age group, the difference is larger for women.
Among the three age groups, the largest difference from the corresponding reference group in
the U.S. on average is displayed by the “old” European men and women. However, as we will
discuss later, because of the relative sizes of the age groups, prime-aged persons (and in particular
prime-aged women) are typically the largest contributors to the aggregate difference with the U.S.
Given that we find that the difference in hours worked between the U.S. and Europe is larger
for women than for men, it is natural to ask whether this is related to women reducing their labor
supply as a result of having children.
Panel A of Table H.14 in the Appendix shows that when we concentrate on a narrower age
group (20-30 years of age), we find that these younger women without small children in Europe
typically have annual hours of work that are closer to their American counterparts.10 This is in
comparison to the same group of young women with small children, where we find a larger gap
in work hours. This pattern is especially true for countries like Austria and Germany. Comparing
columns (2) and (4) for those two nations shows that numbers drop from 100.3% and 82.9% of
9In a few European countries, cohabitation is quite similar to marriage (see Perelli-Harris and Gassen (2012)).
10We thank the anonymous referee for this suggestion.
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U.S. hours to 57.1% and 37.2% of the U.S. hours for Austria and Germany respectively.11
Next, we investigate the contribution of women with small children to the overall difference
in annual hours worked, with respect to U.S. Panel B of Table H.14 in the Appendix shows that
the contribution of women with small children to the overall difference in annual hours worked,
with respect to the U.S., is typically substantially smaller than the contribution of women without
small children. This is intuitive because the annual hours worked by women with small children is
generally lower than other groups in both U.S. and Europe, and this group is not very large. Hence,
the explanatory power of the difference in annual hours worked by women with small children is
itself low. This is the reason why while children may play an important role in labor supply of
young women, the presence of children does not play such a significant role in the difference of
labor supply between U.S. and Europe. Bick and Fuchs-Schundeln (2014) also do not find that
women with small children are a major contributor to the difference in labor supply between U.S.
and European countries. However, more research needs to be done on this important sub-group of
population.
2.3. Group Contribution Decomposition
To analyze the contributions of various demographic groups to the difference between aggregate
labor supply in the U.S. and the European countries in our sample, we perform the following de-
composition. Suppose we divide each country’s sample into n different groups. Then the difference
between the aggregate average annual hours worked in the U.S., ¯hus, and in country j, ¯h j, can be
written as:
¯hus − ¯h j =
n∑
i=1
ωusi husi −
n∑
i=1
ω
j
i h
j
i =
n∑
i=1
(husi − h ji )ωusi
︸              ︷︷              ︸
“behavioral effect”
+
n∑
i=1
(ωusi − ω ji )h ji
︸             ︷︷             ︸
“compositional effect”
(1)
11Table H.14 contains only a subset of countries for which E.U. LFS provide information on children.
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where ω ji is the share of observations that come from group i in country j’s sample, while h ji is the
average annual hours worked by individuals in this group.12 The last term in Equation 1, which we
call the “compositional” effect, reflects the differences in hours worked due to the differences in the
composition of the population in the two countries. For instance, a positive compositional effect
would mean that in the U.S., the demographic groups that typically work more (such as prime-
aged men) have relatively larger size, and the demographic groups that typically work less (such
as older women) have smaller size compared to the corresponding European country j. We are
more interested in the first term which we call the “behavioral effect”. It captures the differences in
hours worked by various demographic groups in the two countries, assuming that the composition
of the population in these two countries is the same.
We divide the data into 12 demographic groups, according to gender, marital status and age
(using three age groups). Table 2 reports the contribution of various demographic groups to the
difference in aggregate labor supply. Columns (2) and (3) divide the population by gender, and add
up to one. Columns (4) - (6) divide the population by age, i.e. Young, Prime-aged and Old, and add
up to one as well. As can be seen from Column (7) in Table 2, the compositional effect is typically
small. On average, it accounts for 6.6% of the difference between the U.S. and the European
countries in our dataset. The rest of the difference is due to the behavioral effect. Columns (8) and
(9) report the intensive and extensive margins, and add up to one.
Columns (2-6) in Table 2 shows the contribution of several demographic groups of interest to
the behavioral effect (while Table H.11 in the Appendix provides more details). To compute the
weighted means for the three subgroups, and for all European countries in our sample, we weight
them according to the size of the difference from the U.S.13 The table shows that in Central and
especially in Southern Europe, women are the main contributors to the differences in hours worked
12This is similar to the decomposition performed in Blundell, Bozio, and Laroque (2011). They analyze the changes
in hours worked over time, while we look at the differences in hours worked between countries at a given point in time.
13We use the weights ωi = ∆U.S .,i∑
i ∆U.S .,i
. One feature of such a weighting scheme is that it puts lower weight on Switzer-
land, which appears to be a special case. The difference between the U.S. and Switzerland is very small to begin with
and therefore a relatively small absolute difference for one demographic group can be a large percentage difference.
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between the U.S. and the European countries. In particular, the biggest contribution in these two
groups of countries are coming from married prime-aged women. In contrast to this, in the Nordic
countries, the biggest contribution comes from married prime-aged men.
As we mentioned earlier, the largest difference in terms of hours worked per person is displayed
by older persons. However, because of the small size of that demographic group, their contribution
to the overall difference is much smaller than the contribution of the prime-aged individuals.
2.4. Intensive vs. Extensive Margin
In this subsection we investigate whether the discrepancies in work hours between the U.S. and
Europe are due to Americans working longer hours (intensive margin) or whether they are due
to more Americans working (extensive margin). We find that the two margins are about equally
important.
The two last columns of Table 2 show the contribution of the intensive and extensive margins to
the difference in labor supply between the U.S. and country i, using the following decomposition
formula:
¯hU.S . − ¯hi = HU.S .empl · Share
U.S .
empl − H
i
empl · Share
i
empl
=
(
HU.S .empl − H
i
empl
)
ShareU.S .empl︸                          ︷︷                          ︸
Intensive Margin
+
(
ShareU.S .empl − Share
i
empl
)
Hiempl︸                               ︷︷                               ︸
Extensive Margin
(2)
From the OECD data, one can compute the total average hours worked in country i, Hi, as the
product of the hours worked by employed persons, Hi
empl, and the share of the population which
is employed, Shareiempl. Table 2 reports the contributions of intensive and extensive margins as a
percentage of the total difference in hours worked between the U.S. and country i, ¯hU.S . − ¯hi. As
can be seen from the table, both margins appear to be important. The contribution of the extensive
margin is particularly large in Southern Europe, while the intensive margin is more important in
the Nordic countries, Netherlands and Germany (with Switzerland being a special case).
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3. Possible Determinants of Labor Supply: Taxes and Marriage Stability
Taxes have been suggested as a major contributor to cross country differences in labor supply
in the literature (see Prescott (2004) and Rogerson (2006)). Marriage stability is a new explanation
in this context, motivated by our finding in Section 2 that women are the biggest contributor to the
cross-country differences in labor supply. Our hypothesis is that more stable marriages provide
consumption insurance, thereby reducing the incentives to accumulate labor market experience, in
particular for women who often are secondary earners. Conversely, a higher probability of divorce
can increase the value of market experience for the woman who has a higher probability of ending
up as a single earner.
It is well-known that the level of labor income taxes are higher in Europe (see Prescott (2004)).
However, there are many issues to consider when comparing labor income taxes across countries.
Both the cross-country differences in tax levels and tax progressivity may be of interest. We use
2 measures that capture some elements of the cross-country differences in tax progressivity: (1)
top marginal tax rates, (2) progressivity wedge (PW) measure from Guvenen, Kuruscu, and Ozkan
(2013):14
PW(y1, y2) = 1 − 1 − τ(y2)1 − τ(y1) (3)
This intuitive measure, where a higher value indicates a more progressive tax schedule, takes values
between 0 and 1 but will naturally be sensitive to the choice of y1 and y2, except with flat taxes.
If there is a flat tax, then the progressivity wedge would be zero for all levels of y1 and y2. Table
H.10 in the Appendix shows that according to this measure, among the 18 countries in the table,
Denmark has the most progressive taxes and Switzerland the least progressive. The U.S. is among
the countries with the least progressive taxes, while Germany is among the countries with the most
progressive taxes.
Consumption taxes may also have an impact on labor supply decisions, since it affects the
purchasing power of the after-tax income the worker receives. The consumption tax varies from
14An analogous measure is used in Caucutt, Imrohoroglu, and Kumar (2003).
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a low 7.6% in Switzerland, to a high 25% in Denmark and Sweden. The U.S. has the second
lowest consumption tax among the countries in our dataset. To capture the joint effect of labor and
consumption taxes, we consider the effective tax rate on labor income, τ, as defined in Prescott
(2004) is τ = 1 − 1−τl1+τc , which is the fraction of labor income that is taken by the government in the
form of labor and consumption taxes.
Table 3 shows the results of regressing (the log of) average annual hours of work on the number
of divorces per 1000 married people and each of our tax measures.15 In columns (3) and (4), we find
that both the divorce rate and the average tax rate/average effective tax rate are highly statistically
significant, and have the expected sign – higher taxes tend to reduce average hours worked, while
higher number of divorces tend to increase them.
Figure 1 shows that the taxes and divorces affect men and women differently. While there is
a strong positive correlation between the divorce rates and hours worked for women, the corre-
sponding correlation for men is positive but close to zero. On the other hand, while there is a
strong negative correlation between the hours worked and the average effective tax rate for men,
the corresponding correlation for women is also negative but close to zero.
This is further confirmed in Panel B of Table 3 where we regress (the logarithm of) hours
worked on divorce rate and average effective tax rate for men and women separately.
4. Model
The stationary economy is populated by three types of households: single males, single fe-
males, and married couples. Individuals start their work life at age 20. They live for at least 65
years and at most 95 years, but enter retirement at age 65. A model period is 1 year, so there
are a total of 45 model periods of active work life. In addition to demographics, households are
heterogeneous with respect to asset holdings, years of labor market experience, and idiosyncratic
productivity shocks (market luck). Single households face an age-dependent probability of be-
coming married, while married couples face an age-dependent probability of divorce. One is more
15We provide the details of how we construct these divorce rates in the calibration section below.
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likely to be married to someone with a similar level of education. We assume that marriage will
always happen to a partner of the same age, and that married couples die together. Households
decide whether or not to participate in the labor market, how many hours to work conditional on
participation, how much to consume, and how much to save. If they participate in the labor market,
they accumulate one year of labor market experience.
4.1. Labor Income
Individuals choose work hours, n ∈ [0, 1]. The wage per time unit, w, of an individual depends on
his level of education, j ∈ {hs, c} (where “hs” stands for high school and “c” stands for college),
gender, g ∈ {m, f}, years of labor market experience, x, and idiosyncratic productivity shock, u:
w( j, g, x, u) = eγ0 jg+γ1 jg x+γ2 jg x2+γ3 jg x3+u (4)
u′ = ρ jgu + ǫ, ǫ ∼ N(0, σ2jg) (5)
Given this wage function, the beginning wage level as well as the returns to experience and id-
iosyncratic shock process are allowed to differ by level of education and gender. The productivity
shock is assumed to follow the AR(1)-process in Equation 5.
4.2. Preferences
The momentary utility function of single individuals, US , depends on work hours, n ∈ [0, 1],
consumption, c, and gender, g:
US (g, c, n) = log(c) − χg n
1+ηg
1 + ηg
− Fg1[n>0] (6)
Fg is a fixed, gender specific, disutility from working positive hours. The indicator function, 1[n>0],
is equal to 0 when n = 0 and equal to 1 when n > 0. χg here captures the taste for work while 1/ηg
is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply conditional on employment. Married couples have a joint
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utility function, UM , with shared consumption, measured in adult equivalents:
UM(c, nm, n f ) = log(c/e) − χm n
1+ηm
m
1 + ηm
− χ f
n
1+η f
f
1 + η f
− Fm1[nm>0] − F f1[n f >0] (7)
4.3. Marriage and Divorce
Marriages and divorces occur exogenously in the model. Single households face an age-dependent
probability, ω¯(t), of marriage whereas married households face an age-dependent probability , π(t),
of divorce. We assume that one is always married to someone of the same age and that married
couples die together. Except for age, the only form of assortative mating in the model is by educa-
tion. There is a higher probability, ω¯intra ed., of marrying someone with the same level of education.
Conditional on age, education and gender, a draw of partner is made from the distribution of singles
generated by the model, Q jgt( j, x, k, u). This means that the agents in the model have rational ex-
pectations about their partner’s education level, j, experience, x, asset holdings, k and productivity
shock, u.
4.4. Government
The government taxes consumption and labor income and runs a balanced budget. We assume
that a fraction (1 − ϑ) of the government revenues are wasted, i.e. spent on things that are not in
the model.16 The remainder of the government’s revenues are spent on social security payments,
Ψg, transfers to unemployed people, T , and lump sum transfers to households, G. G captures a
wide range of government expenditure, from education and healthcare to social aid and disability
insurance. It is beyond the scope of the paper to model these programs in great detail. It is,
however, reasonable to assume that these programs are progressive in the idiosyncratic shock, u.
We let G(u) = αu(umax − u), where umax is the highest realized value of u.17 Similar assumptions
about the progressivity of G are made by Oh and Reis (2012) and McKay and Reis (2013), who
study government transfer programs in greater detail. Let ΥS (g, j, k, x, u, t) be the measure of single
households over gender, g, education, j, assets, k, experience, x, productivity shock, u, and age, t,
and ΥM( jm, j f , k, xm, x f , um, u f , t) be the measure of married households. The government budget
16Examples would be interest payments, national defense etc.
17We discretize the process for u using the method developed by Tauchen (1986). αu is adjusted to balance the
budget.
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can thus be written:
∫
GdΥS +
∫ (
Gm +G f
)
dΥM = ϑ
∫ (
nwτS (wn) + cτc)dΥS + ϑ
∫ ((nmwm + n f w f )τM(nmwm + n f w f ) + cτc)dΥM
−
∫ (
T1[t≤44,n=0] + Ψg1[t>44]
)dΥgS −
∫ (
T (1[t≤64,nm=0] + 1[t≤64,n f=0])
)dΥM −
∫ ((Ψm + Ψ f )1[t>44])dΥM
(8)
Equation 8 says that the sum of lump sum payments to households is equal to the fraction of
tax revenues that is not wasted minus expenses on social security and transfers to non-working
households.
4.5. Household’s Problem
Let r be the risk-free interest rate, and β the time discount factor. τc and τk represent flat taxes
on consumption and capital, whereas τS and τM are nonlinear labor income taxes for singles and
married couples, respectively. In most OECD countries, at least some part of the tax schedule is
dependent on whether a person is single or married. There is, however, significant cross country
variation. Written recursively, a single household’s problem can be formalized as follows:
VS (g, j, k, x, u, t) = max
c,n,k′
US (g, c, n) + β
(
(1 − ω¯(t))Eu′[VS (g, j, k′, x′, u′, t + 1)]
+ω¯(t)E jp,k′p,x′p,u′,u′p
[
V M( j, jp, k′ + k′p, x′, x′p, u′, u′p, t + 1)
])
s.t.: c(1 + τc) + k′ = k(1 + r(1 − τk)) + nw( j, g, x, u)(1 − τS (w( j, g, x, u)n))
+G(u) + (1 − 1[n>0])T
x′ = x + 1[n>0], n ∈ [0, 1], k′ ≥ 0, c > 0, (9)
The subscript, p, stands for partner. In the case that an individual becomes married in the next
period, the expectation of next period’s utility must be taken with respect to the distribution over
potential partners’ education, experience, asset holdings, and idiosyncratic productivity shock,
Q jgt( jp, x′p, k′p, up)18. Married couples maximize their joint utility and face an age-dependent prob-
18Q jgt and ΥS are related as follows. Let the single person i have gender gi, age ti and education level ji. Then:
Q jiqiti ( j, x, k, u) = ω¯intra edΥS (−gi, ji, k, x, u, ti) + (1 − ω¯intra ed)ΥS (−gi,− ji, k, x, u, ti),
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ability, π(t), of becoming divorced. When couples divorce, they split their assets evenly. Their
problem can be written as:
V M( jm, j f , k, xm, x f , um, u f , t) =
max
c,k′,nm,n f
UM(c, nm, n f ) + β(1 − π(t))Eu′m ,u′f
[
V M( jm, j f , k′, x′m, x′f , u′m, u′f , t + 1)
]
+ βπ(t)Eu′m
[
VS (m, k′/2, x′m, u′m, t + 1)
]
+ βπ(t)Eu′f
[
VS ( f , k′/2, x′f , u′f , t + 1)
]
s.t: c(1 + τc) + k′ = k(1 + r(1 − τk)) + (nmwm + n f w f )(1 − τM(nmwm, n f w f ))
+G(um) +G(u f ) + (2 − (1[nm>0] + 1[n f >0]))T
x′m = xm + 1[nm>0], x
′
f = x f + 1[n f >0], n f , nm ∈ [0, 1], k′ ≥ 0, c > 0 (10)
Retired households make no labor supply decisions but receive an amount of social security, Ψg,
depending on their gender. We assume that retirees receive a lump sum redistribution equal to a
working individual with a 0 shock. We also assume that retired households do not marry or get
divorced, and that husband and wife die at the same time. Their problem, if single, is simply:
VS (g, k, t) = max
c>0,k′≥0
US (g, c) + Ω(t)βVS (g, k′, t + 1)
s.t.: c(1 + τc) = k(1 + r(1 − τk)) + Ψg +G(u = 0) (11)
where Ω(t) is the probability of survival until the next period. Married retirees solve:
V M(k, t) = max
c>0,k′≥0
UM(c) + Ω(t)βV M(g, k′, t + 1),
s.t.: c(1 + τc) = k(1 + r(1 − τk)) + Ψm + Ψ f + 2G(u = 0) (12)
where −gi denotes the gender opposite to gi, and − ji denotes the education level different from ji.
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5. Calibration
We try to use data from 2000 or the year closest to 2000 that we can obtain. The reason for
this is that for the year 2000, we have data that can be used to construct divorce and marriage
probabilities for all the countries in Western Europe. We also have tax data for all the countries
starting in 2001.
5.1. Preferences
The momentary utility functions for single and married persons are given in Equations 6 and 7,
with consumption measured in adult equivalents, c
e
. We use the OECD adult equivalence scale and
set e = 1.7 for married couples, and e = 1.0 for singles. The discount factor, β, the fixed costs of
working, Fm and F f , as well as χm and χ f are among the estimated parameters. The corresponding
data moments are the mean asset holdings of individuals in households with head aged 20 − 64,
taken from the PSID (99-05), male and female employment rates from the CPS (2000) and work
hours, taken from OECD 2000.
There is considerable debate in the economic literature about the inter-temporal elasticity of
labor supply, see Keane (2011) for a thorough survey. However, there seems to be a consensus that
the elasticity of labor supply for women is larger than that for men. In our model, the inter-temporal
elasticity will be related to both the fixed costs of working, Fm and F f , and the parameters ηm and
η f . We chose to fix the latter two and calibrate the first two within the model. This ensures that
the model matches both the intensive and extensive margin of labor supply for men and women.
Another reason is that η parameters have direct empirical counterparts in the intensive margin
inter-temporal elasticity of labor supply. Kimmel and Kniesner (1998) separately estimate the
intensive margin elasticities, corresponding to 1
ηm
and 1
η f in the model by controlling for selection
and includes a fixed cost of participation. They obtain 0.39 for men and 0.66 for women. We
choose to be slightly more conservative and set 1
ηm
= 0.3, 1
η f
= 0.6.19
19A calibration where we set the elasticity of labor supply of both genders equal to each other, 1
ηm
= 1
η f
= 0.4, yields
similar results.
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5.2. Risk Free Interest Rate
Given the partial equilibrium nature of the model, we take the risk free rate as fixed and calibrate it
using the data. We set the risk free rate equal to the average of 3-month t-bill rates minus inflation
over the period from 1947-2008 based on data from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.20
5.3. Wages
We estimate the experience profile of wages and the processes for the idiosyncratic shocks ex-
ogenously, using the PSID from 1968-1997. After 1997, it is not possible to get years of actual
labor market experience from the PSID. Appendix C describes the estimation procedure in more
detail. We use a maximum likelihood approach to control for selection into the labor market, as
described in Heckman (1976) and Heckman (1979). We estimate different returns to experience
for each gender/education group. We then obtain the residuals from these estimations and use the
panel data structure of the PSID to estimate the parameters for productivity shock process ρ jg and
σ jg by OLS. Our results for the shock processes are in line with Chang and Kim (2006) who use
a similar approach on PSID data. To get levels of earnings that are in line with the asset holdings,
we include a parameter controlling the average earnings of each gender/education group in the
simulated moments estimation. The corresponding data moments are the average wage of each
group in the PSID 99-05.
5.4. Taxes
For single households we use the labor income tax schedule proposed by Benabou (2002) and
recently used in Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2014). For married couples, we modify the
tax function to distinguish between joint and separate taxation of their income. The tax schedule is
then a function of an individual’s (or each of the spouses’) earnings relative to the average earnings
(AE) (see Equations D.1 and D.2 in Appendix D). As described in more detail in the Appendix,
we fit this function to labor income tax data from the OECD tax database (2001). This data is
constructed by the OECD based on tax laws from different countries. It is well suited for cross
20Series TB3MS and GDPDEF.
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country comparisons, see also Guvenen et al. (2013). We fit a different tax schedule for married
and single individuals.
Coming up with an accurate estimate of consumption taxes in the U.S. is complicated by the
fact that there are local county-level taxes in addition to state taxes. Vertex Inc. (a consulting
company) estimated that the average consumption tax in the U.S. was 8.4% in 2002. We use that
number. We follow Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) and set τk=36%.
5.5. Death Probabilities and Social Security
We obtain the probability that a retiree will survive to the next period from the National Center
for Health Statistics (1991-2001). We assume that all retirees receive the same constant Social
Security benefit, which only depends on gender. We obtain the average benefit for males and
females from the Annual Statistical Supplement to the Social Security Bulletin (2000).
5.6. Marriage and Divorce Probabilities
To compute the age-specific probabilities for marriage and divorce for the U.S., we use the data
from the CPS March supplement from 1999-2001. For most European countries, we use the data
from Eurostat on-line database.21 For some European countries, we supplement it with the data
from the IPUMS International.
We assume a stationary environment, where the probabilities of getting married and divorced
do not change over time (we allow them to depend on the age of the person, but not on his/her
cohort). We also assume that the probability of getting married is the same for those who get
married for the first time, and those who were previously divorced. This allows us to compute
the probabilities using the following approach. Let Mt and Dt be the share of the married and
divorced persons respectively at age t.22 Then the probability of getting married at age t, ω¯(t), and
the probability of getting divorced at age t, π(t), is pinned down by:
Mt+1 = (1 − Mt)ω¯(t) + Mt(1 − π(t)) (13)
Dt+1 = Dt(1 − ω¯(t)) + Mtπ(t) (14)
21Available at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database.
22Figure H.8 shows the fraction of married and divorced women by age in the U.S., Italy and Germany.
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We smooth the resulting age-profiles for ω¯(t) and π(t) by fitting a polynomial. We find that the
probability of getting divorced is noticeably higher in the U.S. compared to Italy, and somewhat
higher compared to Germany. At the same time, the probability of getting married reaches its peak
in the U.S. somewhat earlier compared to the two European countries.23
5.7. Transfers to Unemployed, Fixed Cost of Working and Lump Sum Redistribution
People who do not work have other source of income such as unemployment benefits, gifts from
relatives and charities, black market work etc. They also have more time for home production (not
included in the model). Pinning down the money equivalent value of not working is a difficult task.
The number we choose will also affect the size of the fixed cost of working, which we calibrate
endogenously to hit the employment rates for men and women, see Panel B of Table H.13 in the
Appendix. As an approximation for income when not working, we take the average value of non-
housing consumption of households with income less than $5000 per year from the 2000-2001
Consumer Expenditure Survey. As pointed out by Oh and Reis (2012) transfers to households
makes up a majority of the government’s expenditure. To determine ϑ, the fraction of the gov-
ernment’s income, which can be spent on households in the model, we take the U.S. government
budget from 2000 and remove expenditures on defense, interest payments and protection. This
leaves us with 76% of the year 2000 government budget. The corresponding average value of G
in the model is then $2200. As described in the model section, G is, however, decreasing in the
idiosyncratic shock, G = αu(umax − u)24.
We also consider an alternative, country-specific calibration of the government transfers, where
we use the idea from Piketty and Saez (2012), and collect the data on: (1) total public spending; (2)
social public spending that consists of 5 major categories - (a) education, (b) health, (c) pensions,
(d) income support to working age, (e) other social public spending for all countries in our sample
for the year 2000. We use the data from Adema, Fron, and Ladaique (2011) and OECD (2011),
23The computed probabilities use the data for women. We get a qualitatively similar picture when using the data for
both men and women (with the exception that men in all countries tend to get married somewhat later than women).
24The value of αu is determined by the level of lumpsum redistribution. In the benchmark model its value is 0.043.
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which we summarize in the Appendix in Table G.9. We assume that all public spending that does
not fall in one of the “social public spending” subcategories is wasteful from the point of view of
the model agents. We assume that “income support to the working age” and “other social public
spending” (which according to Piketty and Saez (2012) includes social services to the elderly and
the disabled, family services, housing and other social policy areas) are lump-sum transfers to the
poor, while education and health spending are lump-sum transfers to all agents.25
5.8. Calibration Method
The nine parameters which must be calibrated inside the model are found by minimizing the dis-
tance between simulated model moments and data moments. Panel B of Table H.13 in the Ap-
pendix summarizes the nine calibrated parameter values and the data moments. We are able to
match all the moments exactly.
5.9. Model Fit
It is natural to ask how the model performs along some dimensions, which has not been explicitly
targeted. The model does quite well along a number of dimensions. The standard deviation of log
earnings is for instance 0.650 compared to 0.661 in the data. In Figure 2, we plot the life-cycle
profiles of asset holdings and earnings by gender in the model and data. The model does quite
well in matching the life-cycle profiles of earnings and asset holdings in the data. The reason that
average earnings for women is a bit lower in the model than in the data is that the earnings data is
from the PSID, whereas the model was calibrated using wages from the PSID and hours worked
from the CPS (female labor supply is a bit lower in the CPS). The model cannot replicate the hump
shape in work hours over the life-cycle observed in the data.
The simulated Hicksian labor supply elasticity for our model is about 0.41. This is in line with
a survey of empirical studies in Keane (2011), where the average Hicksian elasticity estimate for
22 studies on males is equal to 0.31. Our economy is, however, also inhabited by women who are
25Piketty and Saez (2012) argue that education and health care government spending are approximately a transfer
of equal value for all individuals in expectation over a lifetime.
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known to have more elastic labor supply. The elasticity of female work hours with respect to the
probability of divorce is somewhat smaller than the results in Johnson and Skinner (1986). They
estimate that a 1% increase in divorce probability over a 6-year period leads to a 1.3% increase in
female labor supply. The corresponding number in our model is 0.71%.
6. The Impact of Marriage Stability and Taxation on Labor Supply
We consider three different counterfactual experiments: (i) We replace both the U.S. marriage
and divorce probabilities, and the tax system in the model with the ones we compute for each
European country in our sample; (ii) We replace only the marriage and divorce probabilities, and
leave the tax system unchanged, at the U.S. level; (iii) We replace only the tax system, and leave
the marriage and divorce probabilities unchanged, at their U.S. values.
During these experiments, we keep taxes, old age social security, and income when not working
proportional to the average earnings in the economy.26 In this way, if the society becomes richer
or poorer because of a counterfactual experiment, taxes and social security payments will adjust
accordingly.
6.1. The Effect of Marriage Stability and Taxation
Figure 3 shows the results when simultaneously replacing both the U.S. marriage and divorce
probabilities and the tax system in the model with those obtained for each European country. On
the horizontal axis, we put hours worked in each country relative to the U.S. (in percent) in the
data, while on the vertical axis, we put hours worked relative to the U.S. (also in percent) in the
model.
Ideally, if the model were able to match the hours worked in the European countries exactly,
using just the two mechanisms that we study in this paper, all the observations would fall on the
diagonal line (the black line). If the observation for a particular European country falls to the left
of the diagonal line in the picture, it means that the two mechanisms that we study do not lead to
26In the case of taxes, we have specified them as polynomials in y/AE, where y is individual labor income, and AE
is the average earnings in the economy.
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enough reduction of hours worked in that country compared to the U.S. to match the data perfectly
(agents “work too much” in the model compared to the data), and vice versa if the observation falls
to the right of the diagonal. Hours worked in the U.S. fall on the diagonal line by construction,
since our model is calibrated to match the U.S. in terms of annual hours worked.
Figure 3 shows that we obtain a positive correlation between the hours worked generated by
the model and hours worked that we find in the data, equal to 0.327. We explain 45% of the
variation between the U.S. and the European countries in the data as measured by the coefficient
of determination:
R2 = 1 − SSerr
SStot
(15)
where SSerr =
n∑
i=1
(
hi,model − hi,data
)2
, SStot =
n∑
i=1
(hi,data − hus)2, hi,model is the hours worked in country
i generated by the model, hi,data is the hours worked in country i in the data, and hus is the hours
worked in the U.S. (both in the model and in the data).27 This means that the two mechanisms
that we study work in the right direction. However, since all our European countries but Denmark
fall to the left of the diagonal, this means that the two mechanisms that we study generally do not
reduce the hours worked in the model enough to match the data perfectly.
Column (3) of Table 4 lists the results for each country in the model, as percent of hours worked
in the U.S., next to the observed value in the data in Column 2. As can be seen from the table,
we are relatively more successful in explaining hours worked in the Nordic countries and Central
Europe than in Southern Europe.
Panels (b) and (c) of Figure 3 illustrates the impact of one mechanism at a time – we either
change the U.S. marriage and divorce probabilities in the model to those found in the European
countries while keeping the tax system unchanged (i.e., set to the U.S. level), or change the U.S.
tax system while keeping the marriage and divorce probabilities unchanged. In both cases, we
get positive correlations between the hours worked generated in the model and those that we find
27In the literature our R2 is also referred to as the “forecast skill” measure. It evaluates by how much the model in
question improves the forecast compared to some reference model. In our case, the hours worked in the U.S. are used
as the “reference model”.
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in the data – higher taxes and higher marriage stability reduce hours worked in the model. The
correlations with the data in both separate experiments are of about equal strength, and smaller
than those from the combined experiment, suggesting that both mechanisms play an important role
in accounting for the difference in hours worked between the U.S. and Europe (which is similar
to what we found in Section 3). As measured by R2, divorce and marriage probabilities explain
17% of the variation in labor supply between the U.S. and the European countries, whereas taxes
explain 32%.
As can be seen from Columns 4 and 5 in Table 4, taxes generally work in the wrong direction
for the Southern European countries, which have low taxes, and hours increase relative to the
United States. However, Southern European countries have very low divorce rates, which work in
the right direction for these countries. In the Nordic countries divorce and marriage probabilities
work in the wrong direction. These countries have very low marriage rates, and also high divorce
rates. Taxes, however, do a good job of predicting labor supply in the Nordic countries. In Central
Europe both the divorce and tax mechanisms reduce hours relative to the U.S.
Table 5 shows the results from the alternative, country-specific calibration of the government
transfers. In this alternative calibration, when we replace both the marriage and divorce probabil-
ities and the tax system from the European countries, we explain 47.5% of the variation in hours
worked between the U.S. and the European countries, as measured by R2.
6.2. The Effect on Men and Women Separately
Figure 4 and Columns (6-13) of Table 4 present the results. The figure shows that there is a very
pronounced difference in how these two mechanisms affect men and women in our model. Female
labor supply is mostly correlated with the marriage stability mechanism. Female hours worked fall
in countries with more stable marriages. At the same time, in the model where we only change
the tax system, leaving the marriage and divorce probabilities at their U.S. levels, the correlation
between the actual hours worked by women in the data and those generated by our model is small
and negative. As measured by R2, divorce and marriage probabilities explain 22% of the variation
in female labor supply between the U.S. and the European countries, while taxes do not help to
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explain the differences in hours worked in our model.
The results for men are directly opposite to those for women. In our model, men appear to react
mostly to the changes in the tax system. When we change the marriage and divorce probabilities
and leave the taxes at their U.S. levels, the correlation between the actual hours worked by men in
the data and those generated by our model is small and negative. This is in line with our findings in
Section 2 that there is no correlation between male labor supply and divorce rates in the data. The
R2 for men is 9% when we introduce European marriage and divorce probabilities and 71% when
we introduce European tax systems into the model. We conclude that taxes are a very powerful
explanation for male labor supply, while divorce and marriage rates help significantly in explaining
female labor supply.
6.3. The Impact of Tax Progressivity and Separate Taxation on Male and Female Labor Supply
Why do the higher European taxes affect men much more than women in our model? The effect
is related to the structure of the tax systems. The European countries with high average labor
income taxes are also more likely to have higher tax progressivity (the correlation between the
average effective labor income tax rate and the tax progressivity measure that we used in Section
3 is for instance 0.389 is our sample), meaning that the higher tax rates in these countries will
disproportionately affect high earners. It is even possible that because of the tax progressivity,
low earners face lower tax rates in Europe compared to the U.S. Another important feature of tax
systems is joint versus separate taxation. Guner, Kaygusuz, and Ventura (2012) point out how
separate taxation of married couples encourages female labor supply through lowering the tax rate
on the secondary earner in a married couple (usually the female)28. Because of the gender wage
gap, men are more likely to be among the high earners. Because countries with high average tax
rates typically also have very progressive taxes and practice separate taxation of married couples,
men bear most of the burden from the higher European tax rates.
To study the impact of tax structure versus tax level, we conduct the following experiment. We
28Figure H.7 in the Appendix shows negative correlation between s1 ( our measure of joint taxation of married
couples) and hours worked by married women.
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start with our benchmark model, which we calibrated using the U.S. labor income taxes. Then
we first change the labor income taxes so that the average labor income tax rate would be equal
to that in Norway, but tax progressivity would remain the same as in the U.S.29 The degree to
which couples are taxed jointly is also kept like in the US in this experiment. Next, we change to
a Norwegian tax system. We choose Norway because it is both among the countries in our sample
for which the impact of the tax change on labor supply was much larger for men than for women.
Norway has a highly progressive tax system and practices separate taxation of married couples.
Figure 5 shows what happens to hours worked for men and women at different wage-quintiles
as we change the tax system. The results confirm our intuition. As we change the U.S. taxes to the
Norwegian tax level, keeping tax progressivity unchanged, the work hours schedule shifts down-
ward – individuals at all wage-quintiles reduce their labor supply. As we change to a Norwegian
tax system, the work hours schedule also changes its shape – because of the higher tax progressiv-
ity and separate taxation of married couples, the lowest earners actually increase their work hours,
while higher earners reduce their work hours further.
6.4. Intensive vs. Extensive Margin
In Section 2 we documented that the intensive and extensive margin are about equally important
in accounting for differences in labor supply between the U.S. and Europe but that the importance
of the two margins varies greatly with region. Table H.12 in the Appendix displays our model’s
performance in accounting for the intensive and extensive margin of labor supply across countries.
We find that divorce and marriage probabilities explain 33% of the variation in employment rates
between the U.S. and our European countries and do not help to explain the variation in the inten-
sive margin. However, for taxes it is the other way around. Taxes explain 47% of the variation in
intensive margin hours between the U.S. and the European countries but do not help in explaining
the variation in the employment rates. This is similar to what we find in the data.30
29See Appendix F for the details.
30In unreported regressions, we find that when extensive and intensive margin labor supply is regressed on divorce
rates and tax measures, taxes only help explain the variation in intensive margin labor supply and divorce rates only
help explain the variation in extensive margin labor supply.
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6.5. Discussion
The correlation between female labor supply in the data and in our model when we introduce
European divorce and marriage rates is quite strong, 0.61. However as measured by R2 we only
explain 22% of the variation in female labor supply between the U.S. and our European countries.
The effect of marriage and divorce rates pull in the right direction but the size of the effects is not
that large.
A concern may be whether divorces are costly enough in the model. More costly divorces are
likely to increase the impact of marriage and divorce probabilities on labor supply. For instance, we
do not have children in the model. Children usually follow their mother in case of divorce, making
divorce more costly for women (See Ferna´ndez and Wong (2013) for a model that incorporates
this effect). Cubeddu and Rios-Rull (2003) assume that 20% of a couple’s assets are lost when
there is a divorce. This may be a reasonable assumption. Divorces carry large administrative costs,
potential losses related to liquidation of home equity, reduced labor market mobility if there are
children in the marriage etc. We leave alternative specifications of the cost of divorce for future
research but believe that the real cost of divorce is larger than in the current model.
7. Conclusion
In this paper we show that prime aged women are the largest contributor to differences in aggre-
gate labor supply between the U.S. and Europe. We document a negative cross-country correlation
between tax levels and labor supply and a positive correlation between divorce rates and labor sup-
ply across countries. However, the first correlation is driven by a strong correlation between male
labor supply and taxes, whereas the latter correlation is driven by a strong correlation between
female labor supply and divorce rates.
To quantify the impact of differences in tax schemes and divorce/marriage rates on labor supply,
we develop a life-cycle, overlapping-generations model with heterogeneous agents, marriage, and
divorce. We calibrate our model to U.S. data and study how labor supply in the U.S. changes as we
introduce European tax systems, and as we replace the U.S. divorce and marriage rates with their
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European equivalents. Combining these two mechanisms can account for 45% of the variation in
hours worked between the U.S. and the European countries. Taxes are a good predictor of male
labor supply but do not help explaining the variation in female labor supply. Divorce and marriage
rates can explain some of the variation in female labor supply across countries but is a worse
predictor of male labor supply.
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Table 1: Annual Hours Worked, all Persons 15-64 Years of Age. Hours worked per year for the U.S., percent of the U.S. for other countries.
Country: All Men Women Men, Women, Men, Women, Men, Women, Men, Women, Men, Women,
married married single single 15-24 yr 15-24 yr 25-54 yr 25-54 yr 55-64 yr 55-64 yr
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Nordic countries:
Denmark 88.80 87.95 91.98 81.10 92.90 107.00 88.30 136.10 121.80 82.40 88.60 77.80 72.20
Finland 86.92 83.33 91.45 80.90 98.50 97.40 83.40 108.40 98.20 85.10 95.50 56.40 70.10
Norway 83.32 84.86 79.96 81.90 81.90 98.80 76.50 108.70 93.50 79.70 77.00 90.70 82.90
Sweden 89.72 86.18 93.99 83.40 99.50 104.20 88.40 89.30 87.80 84.40 92.80 87.20 100.70
Group Mean: 87.19 85.58 89.34 81.83 93.20 101.85 84.15 110.62 100.33 82.90 88.48 78.02 81.48
Central Europe:
Austria 83.24 88.76 75.38 80.00 66.40 107.30 86.50 136.30 129.60 90.20 78.00 56.00 30.80
Belgium 69.18 74.89 60.96 71.80 59.00 81.10 61.80 69.80 62.20 80.20 68.30 42.80 20.70
France 72.18 74.98 68.22 74.10 69.40 81.60 65.50 68.10 57.60 81.10 74.50 42.70 39.40
Germany 71.00 74.68 64.93 69.50 55.70 86.40 76.90 96.90 104.40 75.10 66.30 57.60 38.80
Luxembourg 76.60 85.96 62.07 82.50 55.60 86.40 72.50 76.40 66.00 92.30 66.20 50.60 27.30
Netherlands 76.01 88.19 57.81 81.80 47.80 99.60 72.90 105.90 102.50 87.40 55.70 63.60 27.10
Switzerland 97.24 107.68 84.89 98.00 60.10 130.50 113.20 141.40 161.40 98.70 79.30 109.20 66.90
UK 90.17 97.47 80.85 92.60 76.30 110.10 84.80 126.10 122.30 95.50 79.70 85.50 55.60
Group Mean: 79.45 86.58 69.39 81.29 61.29 97.88 79.26 102.61 100.75 87.56 71.00 63.50 38.33
South Europe:
Greece 87.09 98.35 71.73 95.70 72.10 100.60 67.20 99.10 76.20 100.80 76.60 92.40 55.00
Ireland 82.17 92.35 66.55 92.10 55.80 101.80 77.70 121.70 105.70 92.40 66.40 94.40 39.90
Italy 73.70 84.54 58.37 82.50 54.70 87.60 62.20 78.70 63.10 89.30 63.50 60.10 29.70
Portugal 88.57 90.62 85.60 87.70 89.10 91.80 74.70 123.50 98.60 90.80 91.20 88.50 69.30
Spain 73.04 83.45 58.00 83.60 52.60 85.30 64.10 95.30 72.40 85.30 61.40 78.50 36.50
Group Mean: 80.91 89.86 68.05 88.32 64.86 93.42 69.18 103.66 83.20 91.72 71.82 82.78 46.08
Overall Mean: 81.70 87.31 73.69 83.48 69.85 97.50 77.45 104.81 95.49 87.69 75.35 72.59 50.76
United States 1360.40 1613.00 1121.30 1931.70 1171.90 1191.30 1087.50 714.30 574.30 1951.90 1332.00 1354.80 894.80
Note: This table reports the annual hours works by each group as a fraction of the respective U.S. group in the year 2000. Column (2) shows the average annual hours worked per
European country in our sample. Columns (3) and (4) show cross-country differences in hours worked for men and women separately. We divide the European countries in our sample
in 3 subgroups: Nordic countries, Central Europe and Southern Europe. Columns (5-8) compare the average annual hours worked by marital status. Columns (9-14) compares the
cross-country differences in hours worked by gender and 3 age groups: (i) “young” (16-24 years of age), (ii) “prime-aged” (25-54 years of age) and (iii) “old” (55-64 years of age).
Column (2) shows that the average work hours in Europe are 81.70% of (or about 249 hours less than) those in the U.S. Columns (3) and (4) show that the difference in work hours
for women is about 45 percent larger than for men. There is large variation within Europe. The difference in work hours is driven by Southern European women, where the difference
for women is about two to three times larger than the corresponding difference for men. Columns (5-8) show that married women in Central and Southern Europe display the largest
difference from their U.S. counterparts. Columns (9-14) show that among the three age groups, the largest difference is displayed by the “old” European men and women. However, due
to the relative sizes of the age groups, prime-aged persons (and in particular prime-aged women) are typically the largest contributors to the aggregate difference with the U.S.
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Table 2: Contribution of Demographic Groups to Overall Difference in Annual Hours Worked, with respect to the U.S.
Country Men Women Young Prime- Old Compo- Intensive Extensive
aged sition Margin Margin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Nordic countries
Denmark 62.3 37.7 -31.4 105.9 25.5 8.9 124.0 -24.0
Finland 73.6 26.4 -6.7 69.5 37.2 18.8 35.4 64.6
Norway 49.1 50.9 -2.1 94.8 7.3 -3.9 124.4 -24.4
Sweden 73.0 27.0 7.9 85.2 6.9 6.9 102.7 -2.7
Central Europe
Austria 36.6 63.4 -24.7 82.6 42.1 17.0 57.8 42.2
Belgium 47.7 52.3 9.4 66.5 24.1 4.4 51.4 48.6
Netherlands 30.9 69.1 -3.0 80.6 22.4 -4.0 91.0 9.0
Germany 50.3 49.7 -0.7 81.1 19.6 5.4 68.2 31.8
Switzerland -74.8 174.8 -138.6 211.4 27.3 -40.2 34.4 65.6
France 50.8 49.2 11.5 64.7 23.8 5.3 48.0 52.0
Luxembourg 36.4 63.6 10.0 61.3 28.7 8.0 40.5 59.5
UK 12.1 87.9 -30.6 98.0 32.5 9.1 75.3 24.7
Southern Europe
Greece 0.4 99.6 5.0 67.6 27.4 22.5 -120.2 220.2
Ireland 15.0 85.0 -10.8 91.9 19.0 11.8 35.7 64.3
Italy 33.9 66.1 9.9 67.2 22.9 6.0 -5.2 105.2
Portugal 52.7 47.3 -17.7 90.5 27.2 26.3 33.8 66.2
Spain 33.6 66.4 3.8 79.0 17.2 9.8 21.2 78.8
R2 − − − − − − 0.138 0.423
Mean : 34.3 65.7 -12.3 88.1 24.2 6.6 63.3 36.7
Mean (weighted): 39.7 60.3 -2.3 78.8 23.5 7.6 49.6 50.4
Mean (Nordic): 63.0 37.0 -7.7 88.9 18.8 6.9 97.3 2.7
Mean (Central): 39.3 60.7 -2.1 76.0 26.1 4.8 64.1 35.9
Mean (South): 28.0 72.0 0.3 78.0 21.7 12.8 -5.7 105.7
Note: This table reports the contributions of various demographic groups to the difference between aggregate labor supply in the
U.S. and the European countries in our sample. Each column captures the differences in hours worked by various demographic
groups in the two countries, assuming that the composition of the population in these two countries is the same. The data is
divided into 12 demographic groups, according to gender, marital status and age (using three age groups). Columns (2) and (3)
divide the population by gender, and add up to one. Columns (4) - (6) divide the population by age, i.e. Young, Prime-aged
and Old, and add up to one as well. Column (7) reports the compositional effect, i.e. the differences in hours worked due to
the differences in the composition of the population in the two countries. This is typically small, and on average, accounts for
6.6% of the difference between the U.S. and the European countries in our dataset. Columns (8) and (9) report the intensive
and extensive margins, and add up to one. The table shows that in Central and Southern Europe, women – specifically married
prime-aged women – are the main contributors to the differences in hours worked between the U.S. and the European countries.
Older persons’ contribution to the overall difference is much smaller than the contribution of the prime-aged individuals due to
the smaller size of group.
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Table 3: Relation between Average Hours Worked, Divorce Rates and Tax Measures
Panel A: Hours for both genders
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Divorce rate 0.026∗ 0.023∗ 0.039∗∗∗ .038∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
Top marginal tax rate −0.004 – – –
(0.004)
Progressivity wedge – −0.622 – –
(0.432)
Average labor income tax – – −0.869∗∗∗ –
(0.287)
Average effective tax rate – – – −0.913∗∗∗
(0.264)
Const 7.117∗∗∗ 7.057∗∗∗ 7.113∗∗∗ 7.223∗∗∗
(0.189) (0.113) (0.081) (0.099)
Adjusted R2 0.142 0.184 0.423 0.484
Panel B: Average hours by gender
Men Women
Divorce rate 0.019∗ 0.070∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.019)
Average effective tax rate −1.055∗∗∗ −0.710
(0.229) (0.474)
Const 7.595∗∗∗ 6.705∗∗∗
(0.086) (0.179)
Adjusted R2 0.533 0.403
Standard errors are in parentheses, ∗ – p < 0.10, ∗∗ – p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ – p < 0.01
Note: Panel A reports the results of regressing logarithm of average hours worked in each country in the dataset on number of
divorces per 1000 married persons and each tax measure for both genders together. Panel B reports the results of regressing
logarithm of average hours worked on divorce rates and average effective tax rate by gender. Panel A Columns (3) and (4)
show that both the divorce rate and the average tax rate/average effective tax rate are highly statistically significant, and have the
expected sign – higher taxes tend to reduce average hours worked, while higher number of divorces tend to increase them. Panel
B shows that for women, the divorce rates are statistically significant and have three times larger magnitude than for men. The
average effective tax rates are highly statistically significant for men, but not for women.
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Table 4: Hours Worked in the Model and in the Data, in Percent of the U.S. hours
All Men Women
Data Tax. & Div. Divorces Taxes Data Tax. & Div. Divorces Taxes Data Tax. & Div. Divorces Taxes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Nordic countries:
Denmark 83.5 74.4 100.5 73.9 82.3 70.9 100.5 70.3 86.9 79.7 100.6 79.1
Finnland 85.5 94.4 102.4 92.9 81.3 87.3 100.6 86.4 90.6 104.6 105.0 102.2
Norway 80.6 92.2 100.1 92.3 81.7 87.1 99.9 87.3 77.7 99.7 100.5 99.7
Sweden 87.4 90.9 104.8 88.3 83.7 85.5 102.7 84.1 91.9 98.7 107.9 94.2
Mean: 84.3 88.0 102.0 86.8 82.3 82.7 100.9 82.0 86.8 95.7 103.5 93.8
Central Europe:
Austria 79.4 96.4 101.1 95.4 84.6 92.0 100.9 91.2 71.8 102.8 101.5 101.6
Belgium 68.4 78.0 96.3 80.4 73.9 73.8 97.8 75.6 60.5 84.0 94.3 87.3
Netherlands 73.5 94.1 97.6 95.8 85.4 89.6 98.4 90.8 55.5 100.8 96.6 102.9
Germany 67.9 82.1 97.0 83.8 71.3 86.2 98.0 87.3 62.1 76.2 95.5 78.8
Switzerland 91.3 98.7 98.6 100.0 101.3 99.3 99.1 100.1 79.4 97.9 97.8 99.8
France 72.4 94.8 99.4 94.8 75.0 94.0 99.2 94.2 68.8 96.0 99.8 95.8
Luxembourg 75.9 93.8 96.3 97.2 85.1 95.5 98.0 96.9 61.4 91.5 93.8 97.5
UK 87.3 101.3 98.7 102.4 94.5 97.5 98.9 98.5 77.9 106.9 98.3 108.1
Mean: 77.0 92.4 98.1 93.7 83.9 91.0 98.8 91.8 67.2 94.5 97.2 96.5
Southern Europe:
Greece 86.5 99.6 92.9 104.8 97.3 96.0 95.9 100.2 71.6 104.9 88.6 111.5
Ireland 82.9 96.4 98.1 97.9 93.0 96.3 98.5 97.8 67.2 96.4 97.5 98.1
Italy 72.0 94.1 93.1 98.7 82.3 89.6 95.8 93.2 57.3 100.7 89.1 106.8
Portugal 87.3 96.8 94.6 101.2 88.9 97.7 97.0 100.3 84.9 95.4 91.0 102.6
Spain 72.0 104.2 95.6 107.2 99.8 99.7 97.2 102.3 57.4 110.8 93.5 114.4
Mean: 80.1 98.2 94.9 102.0 92.3 95.9 96.9 98.8 67.7 101.7 91.9 106.7
U.S.A 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
R2 0.452 0.170 0.321 0.757 0.090 0.708 0.098 0.217 -0.066
Corr(data,model) 0.327 0.326 0.239 0.671 -0.219 0.680 0.040 0.614 -0.140
Note: This table displays hours worked as % of U.S. hours in the data and in the model, after introducing taxes and divorce and marriage rates from other countries. Columns 2 reports
data and column 3 reports the results when we simultaneously replace both the U.S. marriage and divorce probabilities and the tax system in the calibrated model with those obtained
for each European country. Columns 4 and 5 respectively report results when we replace only the marriage and divorce probabilities, and leave the tax system unchanged, at the U.S.
level; and when we replace only the tax system, and leave the marriage and divorce probabilities unchanged, at their U.S. values. Columns 6-13 repeat the exercise by gender. Overall the
model explains 45% of the variation in labor supply between the U.S. and the European countries, as measured by R2.
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Table 5: Hours Worked in the Model and in the Data, in Percent of the U.S. Hours: Alternative Calibration of Govern-
ment Transfers
All Men Women
Data Model Data Model Data Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Nordic countries:
Denmark 83.5 75.1 82.3 71.7 86.9 80.1
Finnland 85.5 94.0 81.3 86.9 90.6 104.4
Norway 80.6 90.1 81.7 84.9 77.7 97.6
Sweden 87.4 89.8 83.7 84.6 91.9 97.5
Mean: 87.3 82.0 94.9 84.2 82.2 86.8
Southern Europe:
Greece 86.5 101.8 97.3 98.2 71.6 107.0
Ireland 82.9 96.7 93.0 96.6 67.2 97.0
Italy 72.0 94.4 82.3 89.9 57.3 100.8
Portugal 87.3 96.6 88.9 97.5 84.9 95.2
Spain 72.0 102.7 99.8 98.2 57.4 109.3
Mean: 98.4 96.1 101.9 80.1 92.3 67.7
Central Europe:
Austria 79.4 96.1 84.6 91.9 71.8 102.2
Belgium 68.4 78.3 73.9 74.4 60.5 83.9
Netherlands 73.5 95.6 85.4 91.2 55.5 102.1
Germany 67.9 80.6 71.3 83.9 62.1 75.9
Switzerland 91.3 97.2 101.3 97.8 79.4 96.2
France 72.4 93.5 75.0 92.5 68.8 94.8
Luxembourg 75.9 94.2 85.1 96.2 61.4 91.1
UK 87.3 99.3 94.5 95.4 77.9 104.9
Mean: 91.8 90.4 93.9 77.0 83.9 67.2
U.S.A. 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
R2 0.475 0.784 0.115
Corr(data,model) 0.326 0.697 0.011
Note: This table displays hours worked as % of U.S. hours in the data and in the model with alternative calibration of government
transfers, after introducing taxes and divorce and marriage rates from other countries. Column 2 reports data and column 3 reports
the results when we simultaneously replace both the U.S. marriage and divorce probabilities and the tax system in the calibrated
model with those obtained for each European country. Columns 4-7 repeat the exercise by gender. Overall the model explains
48% of the variation in labor supply between the U.S. and the European countries, as measured by R2, which is similar that from
the main calibration.
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Figure 1: Correlation between Hours Worked, Divorce Rates and Tax Rates for Men and Women
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Note: This figure reports the correlation between hours worked per year, with divorce and tax rates by gender. There is a strong
positive correlation between the divorce rates and hours worked for women. For men it is positive but close to zero. There is a
strong negative correlation between the hours worked and the average effective tax rate for men. The corresponding correlation
for women is also negative but close to zero.
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Figure 2: Model Fit: Assets and Income over the life-cycle
(a) Assets over the life cycle
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(b) Male Income over the life cycle
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(c) Female Income over life cycle
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Note: The figure plots the life-cycle profiles of asset holdings and earnings by gender in the model and data.
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Figure 3: Combined and Separate Effect of Marriage Stability and Taxes
(a) Combined Effect of Marriage Stability and Taxes
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(b) Effect of Marriage Stability
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(c) Effect of Taxes
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Note: This figure reports the results when simultaneously replacing both the U.S. marriage and divorce probabilities and the tax
system in the model with those obtained for each European country. The horizontal axis represents hours worked in each country
relative to the U.S. (in percent) in the data. The vertical axis represents hours worked relative to the U.S. (in percent) in the model.
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Figure 4: Effects of Marriage Stability and Taxes by Gender
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(a) Men − Marriage and Divorces
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(b) Men − Taxes
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(c) Women − Marriage and Divorces
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(d) Women − Taxes
Corr = −0.219 Corr =  0.680
Corr =  0.614 Corr = −0.140
Note: This figure compares by gender, hours worked as % of U.S. hours in the data and in the model, after introducing taxes and
divorce and marriage rates from other countries. The horizontal axis represents hours worked in each country relative to the U.S.
(in percent) in the data. The vertical axis represents hours worked relative to the U.S. (in percent) in the model.
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Figure 5: Changing Tax Level vs. Changing Tax Progressivity
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Note: This figure reports how average hours worked over the life-cycle vary for men and women at different wage-quintiles
(measure by life-time income) as the tax system changes.
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Marriage Stability, Taxation and Aggregate Labor
Supply in the U.S. vs. Europe
(Internet Appendix)
Appendix A. LFS vs OECD data
Unlike the CPS, the E.U. LFS does not provide information on the number of weeks worked
per year. However, it reports the labor force status during the reference week, which we use to
reconstruct information about weeks worked as follows: we set the number of weeks worked to 52
for people who reported having a job, and to 0 otherwise.31
Table A.6: Annual Hours Worked in OECD vs LFS/CPS micro data
Country LFS/CPS data OECD data LFS/CPS ∆U.S .(LFS/CPS)
∆U.S .OECD− OECD
Austria 1280.5 1132.3 148.2 48.91
Belgium 1073.7 941.1 132.5 75.94
Denmark 1337.7 1208.0 129.6 35.69
Finland 1313.1 1182.5 130.6 44.37
France 1165.7 982.0 183.7 59.81
Germany 1213.8 965.9 247.9 45.19
Greece 1257.1 1184.7 72.3 76.84
Ireland 1265.5 1117.8 147.6 52.18
Italy 1036.4 1002.7 33.7 99.41
Luxembourg 1165.4 1042.1 123.2 71.22
Netherlands 1162.9 1034.0 128.9 70.21
Norway 1359.7 1133.5 226.3 14.24
Portugal 1338.5 1204.8 133.7 34.42
Spain 1119.0 993.6 125.4 74.45
Sweden 1336.6 1220.5 116.1 39.61
UK 1340.9 1226.6 114.2 38.27
Mean: 1235.4 1098.3 137.1 55.05
United States 1392.1 1360.4 31.7 n.a.
It is worth mentioning that the differences in the annual hours worked between the U.S. and
Europe that we find in the micro level data are smaller than the ones reported by the OECD.32 There
is some evidence that most of the discrepancy between the micro-level estimates and the macro-
level statistics reported by the OECD comes from the cross-country differences in the duration of
31We also set the number of weeks worked to 0 for people on maternity or paternity leave, and we set it to 48 for
people who had a job but did not work during the reference week due to labor dispute, and to 40 where it was due to
school education and training, illness or temporary disability.
32Table A.6 provides the details.
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vacations and public holidays. According to the OECD’s online documenation, they use external
sources to adjust for hours not worked due to public holidays and annual leave.
To maintain consistency with the majority of studies of the differences in hours worked be-
tween the U.S. and Europe, which have used the OECD aggregate-level data, we uniformly adjust
the hours worked for all observations in our micro data sets so that the country-level average corre-
sponds to the one reported by the OECD. One downside of doing this is that we cannot capture the
differences in days off between different demographic groups within a given country. However, if
anything, we expect that this should provide us with a conservative estimate of the differences in the
contributions of various demographic groups to the cross-country differences in hours worked.33
Appendix B. Cohabitation
The Eurostat database that we use to compute the marriage and divorce probabilities in the
paper provides the data on persons in registered partnership for only four countries in our sam-
ple: the Netherlands, Denmark, Finland and Sweden starting from 2007. Figure B.6 compares the
marriage and divorce probabilities that we use in the paper (dotted red lines labeled “old”) with
the ones we obtain when we combine the married persons with those in a registered partnership
(the solid blue lines labeled “new”) when using the 2007 data for the Netherlands: The two sets
of probabilities are not very different from one another. One caveat is that it is likely that persons
in registered partnerships most probably do not include all cohabitors. Another caveat is that 2007
was the first year of the recent financial crisis which might have had an impact on the marriage and
divorce behavior. At the same time, we believe that there are many dimensions relevant for this
paper along which people that are legally married and those that only cohabit differ. The existing
research on this matter appears to support this view. Gemici and Laufer (2010) state that “cohabita-
tion constitutes a separate state of union to marriage, either in terms of the different characteristics
of couples who choose to cohabit, or as a different institutional framework that changes the way
in which partners interact. For example, it is legally more difficult for married partners to separate
than cohabiting partners. Moreover, married couples face a different tax schedule than single and
cohabiting individuals do”.
Additionally, the rules for dividing the assets after the separation are also quite different for the
married and the cohabiting couple. When looking at the hours worked (the key variable for our
analysis) of cohabiting women, Gemici and Laufer (2010) conclude that “the difference between
cohabiting women and single women’s labor supply is statistically insignificant”.
33Using a multiplicative factor adjustment, we essentially assume that workers that report longer hours of work in
our data had proportionally longer vacations/days off compared to those who reported less hours of work. We also
attempted to make the adjustment where all observations are adjusted by the same number of days off, which made
practically no difference to the result.
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Figure B.6: Incorporating persons in registered partnerships
Appendix C. Estimation of Returns to Experience and Shock Processes From the PSID
We take the log of Equation 4 and estimate a logarithm(wage) equation using data from the
non-poverty sample of the PSID 1968-1997. We inflation adjust the nominal wages using the GDP
deflator series from the Bureau of Economic Analysis with 2005 as the base year. Equation 5 is
estimated using the residuals from 4. To control for selection bias we use Heckman’s selection
model and estimate it by a maximum likelihood approach. For people that are working and for
which we observe wages, the likelihood density function (or population equation) depends on a
3rd order polynomial in years of labor market experience, x, as well as dummies for the year of
observation, D:
φi
(log(w jgi)) = φi(constant jg + D′iζ jg + γ1 jgxi + γ2 jgx2i + γ3 jgx3i + ui) (C.1)
Labor market experience is the only observable determinant of wages in the model apart from
gender and education. The probability of participation (or selection equation) depends on various
demographic characteristics, Z:
Φ(participation) = Φ(Z′i ξ jg + υi) (C.2)
The variables included in Z are marital status, age, the number of children, years of schooling, time
dummies, and an interaction term between years of schooling and age. We obtain the residuals ui
3
and use them to estimate Equation 5 by OLS. The coefficients γ1 jg, γ2 jg, γ3 jg, ρ jg, and σ jg can be
found in Table H.13.
Appendix D. Fitting Tax Functions Based on Data from the OECD
For single individuals, we use the tax function proposed by Benabou (2002) and recently used
in Heathcote et al. (2014):
ya/AE = θ0(y/AE)1−θ1 (D.1)
where ya is the after-tax (net) income, y is the before-tax (gross) income, AE is equal to the average
earnings in the economy. In this function, θ1 controls the tax progressivity, while θ0 controls the
tax level.
For married couples, we modify the above function, and assume that the after-tax income
depends on the incomes of spouse 1 (y1) and spouse 2 (y2) as follows:
ya/AE = s1
(
θ
jnt
0 [y1/AE + y2/AE]1−θ
jnt
1
)
+ (1 − s1)
(
θ
sep
0 [(y1/AE)1−θ
sep
1 + (y2/AE)1−θ
sep
1 ]
)
(D.2)
We restrict s1 to lie between 0 and 1, and interpret it as a measure of tax “jointness”. Intuitively,
the above function is a weighted average of 2 versions of the Benabou/HSV tax polynomials, where
in the first version, one assumes that the taxation if fully joint, and the second one assumes that its
fully separate.
We use labor income tax data from the OECD Tax Database.34 This data is constructed by the
OECD based on tax laws from different countries. The OECD Tax-Benefit Calculator gives the
net (after taxes and benefits) income for various values of gross labor income of individuals and
married couples, by family type. We use the data for 2001.
For single individuals, we collect the data at 301 equally spaced points with gross labor incomes
between 25% and 500% of the average country earnings. For married couples, we collect the data
for all combinations of the two spouses’ earnings, where the labor earnings of each spouse ranges
from 25% to 300% of the average country earnings (301 grid points for each spouse, with 90601
data points overall).
Tables D.7 and D.8 show tax rates for several values of individual’s and married couple’s
earnings, and some of the tax function parameter values that we find.35 The values of θ1 in Table
D.7 give us some idea about the tax progressivity of the labor income taxes (based only on single
individuals’ taxes), with higher values meaning more progressive taxes.36 Judging from the values
34Available at: http://www.oecd.org/els/benefitsandwagesmodels.htm.
35For married couple, we compute the tax rate here as 1 − ya/(y1 + y2).
36We apply progressive taxes on labor income. In certain countries in certain periods, such as the U.S. presently,
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of θ1 in this table, we see that the U.S. has one of the least progressive tax systems in our sample
(with only Switzerland and Austria having even less progressive taxes). The values of θ0 give us
a measure of the tax level, with higher values meaning lower taxes.37 Judging by the values of θ0,
the U.S. is also among the countries with the lowest tax rates. However, Greece, Ireland, Spain
and UK all have higher values of θ0 (and thus lower taxes for singles with y = AE).
Table D.7: Country Tax Functions for Single Individuals
Tax rates, for different values of y/AE
Country θ0 θ1 y/AE = 0.5 y/AE = 1.0 y/AE = 1.5 y/AE = 2.0
Austria 0.696 0.109 0.218 0.314 0.371 0.370
Belgium 0.597 0.184 0.301 0.429 0.473 0.494
Denmark 0.556 0.218 0.347 0.427 0.502 0.536
Finland 0.700 0.258 0.195 0.329 0.387 0.423
France 0.725 0.148 0.221 0.295 0.323 0.349
Germany 0.608 0.160 0.307 0.420 0.473 0.483
Greece 0.805 0.161 0.048 0.209 0.268 0.290
Ireland 0.807 0.191 0.043 0.170 0.265 0.310
Italy 0.729 0.168 0.171 0.274 0.323 0.360
Luxembourg 0.719 0.159 0.162 0.272 0.347 0.386
Netherlands 0.716 0.214 0.240 0.306 0.354 0.396
Norway 0.674 0.174 0.247 0.314 0.374 0.404
Portugal 0.774 0.144 0.136 0.213 0.259 0.305
Spain 0.802 0.139 0.108 0.201 0.241 0.262
Sweden 0.641 0.163 0.286 0.324 0.386 0.429
Switzerland 0.730 0.104 0.222 0.277 0.289 0.308
UK 0.798 0.177 0.170 0.255 0.288 0.316
U.S.A 0.734 0.112 0.203 0.248 0.304 0.333
As described above, s1 in Table D.8 is a measure of tax “jointness”. We get some intuitive
results that labor taxes in the U.S. are fully joint. In Scandinavian countries, they are either fully
or mostly separate. In Germany, they are mostly joint, while in Spain they are mostly separate.
progressive taxes are applied to the sum of labor and capital income, depending on whether capital gains are taxed at
short or long term rates.
371 − θ0 is the tax rate at y = AE.
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Table D.8: Country Tax Functions for Married Couples
Tax rates, for different values of (y1/AE, y2/AE)
Country s1 ( 0.500, 0.500 ) ( 0.500, 1.000 ) ( 0.500, 1.500 ) ( 1.000, 1.000 ) ( 1.000, 1.500 ) ( 1.500, 1.500 )
Austria 0.804 0.216 0.281 0.332 0.314 0.348 0.371
Belgium 0.917 0.327 0.405 0.442 0.442 0.464 0.477
Denmark 0.054 0.375 0.423 0.473 0.443 0.479 0.503
Finland 0.000 0.224 0.294 0.347 0.329 0.364 0.388
France 0.928 0.233 0.270 0.287 0.295 0.309 0.323
Germany 0.872 0.306 0.375 0.406 0.420 0.447 0.473
Greece 0.000 0.159 0.193 0.241 0.209 0.244 0.268
Ireland 1.000 0.042 0.127 0.160 0.170 0.222 0.265
Italy 0.556 0.203 0.261 0.296 0.285 0.308 0.323
Luxembourg 0.945 0.139 0.197 0.249 0.249 0.296 0.331
Netherlands 0.000 0.238 0.284 0.325 0.306 0.335 0.354
Norway 0.000 0.247 0.292 0.342 0.314 0.350 0.374
Portugal 1.000 0.141 0.175 0.216 0.216 0.243 0.261
Spain 0.125 0.106 0.170 0.207 0.201 0.225 0.241
Sweden 0.355 0.285 0.311 0.361 0.324 0.361 0.386
Switzerland 1.000 0.237 0.269 0.276 0.296 0.309 0.323
U.K. 0.423 0.191 0.234 0.264 0.255 0.275 0.288
U.S.A 1.000 0.227 0.249 0.278 0.278 0.306 0.325
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Appendix E. Computational Details
Appendix E.1. Computation of Optimal Policies
We put boundaries on the capital space and pick a 16 point grid in K = [0, kmax]. Capital is the
only continuous state variable, which is also a choice variable. Following the method outlined
by Tauchen (1986), we approximate the processes for the idiosyncratic productivity shocks, u, as
finite state Markov processes. We use 5 equally spaced states for u in U = [−
√
σ2
1−ρ2 ,
√
σ2
1−ρ2 ].
Let J = {hs, c} be the state space for whether an individual is high school or college educated,
X = {0, ..., 44} be the state space for the number of years of labor market experience, and T =
{20, ..., 95} be the state space for age. The state space for working age married individuals is then:
J × J × K × X × X × U × U × T . Letting G = {m, f } be the state space for gender, the state
space for working age single individuals is: G × J × K × X × U × T . For retired individuals, it
is: G × T × K for singles and T × K for married. We compute the household’s optimal policies
for each state by iterating backwards. We start from age 95, the last possible period of life. In
that period, the next period’s value function is 0, and the optimal policy is to consume as much
as possible. Knowing the value function at age 95, we can compute optimal policies and value
functions for age 94, and so on. The labor market participation decisions are discrete, and so we
compare the different options. For each choice of labor market participation, we must solve for
the optimal level of capital in the next period as well as optimal work hours in the cases where the
individual(s) are participating in the labor market. We find the optimal choice of capital by “golden
search”. To interpolate next period’s value function outside of the grid, we use cubic splines. In
the cases when the individuals are working, each choice of capital in the next period imply an
optimal number of work hours. We solve for optimal work hours using the routine called LCONF
from the IMSL Fortran library. It is based on M. Powell’s method for solving linearly constrained
optimization problems; see IMSL documentation for details. To speed up the computation when
the number of experience levels grow large, we solve the household’s problem for every 4 levels
of experience and linearly interpolate the value- and policy functions at the remaining experience
levels. We follow this approach for households aged 33-64. For households aged 20-32 we solve
the problem for all experience levels.
Appendix E.2. Simulation
We simulate an overlapping generations economy with 100,000 men and 100,000 women in each
identical generation. Knowing today’s state, the policy functions, and next period’s marital status,
we can find the next period’s state. To determine next period’s marital status, we draw a random
number, ν ∈ (0, 1), for every single individual and every married couple in each time period.
We use the age dependent probabilities for divorce and marriage to determine whether a single
individual is going to marry or a couple is going to split. We only let the random number drawn
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by the single men determine if they are going to get married. Then to find them a partner, we sort
single men and women by their random number and find a partner for each man that is going to
change status. We also make sure that the right number of men marry women with the same level
of education.
Appendix E.3. Partial Equilibrium
When we calibrate the model we must have equilibrium in the marriage market, in the sense that
single individuals must have rational expectations about their potential partners in the next period.
This expectation must be taken with respect to education, experience, asset holdings, and idiosyn-
cratic productivity shock, Q jgt( jp, x′p, k′p, up).. Given his own education, an individual knows the
likelihood of marrying someone with high school and college education in the next period. We
keep track of the distribution of single individuals in each education group with respect to capital
and experience for each value of the productivity shock at every age. We start out with an educated
guess for the distribution and then solve the model iteratively until we reach a fixed point. In ad-
dition to the distribution of partners, we must also solve for a fixed point in the government lump
sum distribution of excess tax revenues.
When we perform the policy experiments we also solve for a fixed point in terms of the average
earnings in the economy because the tax functions, the social security payments, and the value of
not working are kept as functions of average earnings.
Appendix F. Introducing a Tax System with Norwegian Level and U.S. Progressivity
Here we follow Guvenen et al. (2013). We want to introduce a new tax function, τ˜(y), which
has the same average tax rate as in Norway but where progressivity, as defined in 3, is the same as
in the U.S. tax system, τU.S .(y). We must have:
1 − 1 − τ˜(y2)
1 − τ˜(y1) = 1 −
1 − τU.S .(y2)
1 − τU.S .(y1) ⇒
1 − τ˜(y2)
1 − τU.S .(y2) =
1 − τ˜(y1)
1 − τU.S .(y1) (F.1)
for all levels of y1 and y2. Letting the fraction 1−τ˜(y)1−τU.S .(y) be equal to a constant, Λ, for all levels of y,
we can obtain a new tax system with the desired properties as follows:
1 − τ˜(y) = Λ(1 − τU.S .(y)) ⇒ τ˜(y) = 1 − Λ + ΛτU.S .(y) (F.2)
We must solve for Λ in the context of the model to obtain the same average tax level as in Norway.
Appendix G. Data for Alternative Calibration of Government Transfers
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Table G.9: Structure of Public Spending by Country
Country Total Public Education Health Pensions Income Support Other Social Total Social “Waste” Transfers to Transfers
Spending to Working Age Public Spending Public Spending the Poor to All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Austria 51.8 5.6 6.6 12.3 6.1 1.8 62.5 37.5 15.2 23.5
Belgium 49.1 5.9 6.6 8.9 6.7 3.3 64.0 36.0 20.4 25.5
Denmark 53.7 8.3 5.1 5.3 7.8 7.4 63.2 36.8 28.3 25.0
Finland 48.4 6 5.1 7.7 7.3 4.2 62.6 37.4 23.8 22.9
France 51.6 6 7.1 11.8 4.8 4 65.3 34.7 17.0 25.4
Germany 45.1 4.5 8.1 11.2 4.4 2.8 68.8 31.2 16.0 27.9
Greece 46.7 3.4 4.7 10.7 1.9 1.8 48.1 51.9 7.9 17.3
Ireland 31.2 4.3 4.6 3.1 3.9 1.7 56.5 43.5 18.0 28.6
Italy 45.8 4.5 5.8 13.6 2.5 1.4 60.7 39.3 8.5 22.5
Luxembourg 37.6 5.4 5.2 7.5 5.7 1.4 67.2 32.8 18.9 28.3
Netherlands 44.1 5 5 5 6.2 3.6 56.2 43.8 22.2 22.7
Norway 42.3 7.8 4.9 4.8 6.4 5.2 68.8 31.2 27.4 30.0
Portugal 41.6 5.2 6.2 7.9 3.7 1.1 57.9 42.1 11.5 27.4
Spain 39.2 4.3 5.2 8.6 4.6 2.1 63.3 36.7 17.1 24.2
Sweden 55.1 7.2 6.3 7.2 6.9 8.1 64.8 35.2 27.2 24.5
Switzerland 35.6 5.4 5 6.6 4.2 2 65.2 34.8 17.4 29.2
United Kingdom 34.1 4.3 5.5 5.3 4.3 3.4 66.8 33.2 22.6 28.7
United States1 33.4 4.9 5.9 5.9 1.7 1 58.1 41.9 8.1 32.3
Note: Data is from Adema et al. (2011) and OECD (2011). Columns 2-7 are in percent of the GDP. Columns 8-11 are in percent of Total Public Spending (Column 2). Column (8) equals
(3)+(4)+(5)+(6)+(7)
(2) · 100. Column (9) equals 100 - (8). Column (10) = (6)+(7)(2) · 100. Column (11) = (3)+(4)(2) · 100.
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Appendix H. Additional Tables and Figures
Figure H.7: Relationship Between Female Hours Worked and s1
(a) All Women
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(b) Married Women
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Note: The left panel shows the relationship between the annual hours worked and s1 , which is our measure of the degree of joint
taxation of married couples, for all women. The right panel does the same for married women only.
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Figure H.8: Share of Married and Divorced Women at Different Ages
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Note: This figure shows the fraction of married and divorced women by age in the U.S., Italy and Germany.
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Table H.10: Tax-Related Measures by Country (OECD Tax Database, 2001)
Country Max. rate Earnings Level Consumption tax Average labor Progressivity
for Max Rate income tax wedge
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Austria 42.7% 2.2*AE 20.0% 31.4% 0.213
Belgium 67.5% 1.2*AE 21.0% 43.0% 0.291
Denmark 62.9% 1.0*AE 25.0% 42.7% 0.303
Finland 59.1% 2.1*AE 22.0% 32.9% 0.272
France 49.5% 1.8*AE 19.6% 29.5% 0.155
Germany 51.2% 1.5*AE 16.0% 43.4% 0.265
Greece 51.6% 3.8*AE 18.0% 16.5% 0.276
Ireland 48.0% 1.1*AE 21.0% 23.0% 0.273
Italy 45.9% 3.7*AE 20.0% 27.1% 0.174
Luxembourg 50.1% 1.1*AE 15.0% 27.3% 0.268
Netherlands 52.0% 1.4*AE 19.0% 30.5% 0.192
Norway 55.3% 2.4*AE 24.0% 31.4% 0.220
Portugal 46.6% 4.9*AE 17.0% 21.3% 0.193
Spain 48.0% 4.2*AE 16.0% 20.1% 0.229
Sweden 55.5% 1.5*AE 25.0% 32.4% 0.191
Switzerland 49.5% 3.9*AE 7.6% 24.6% 0.110
UK 40.0% 1.3*AE 17.5% 25.5% 0.155
USA 47.4% 9.0*AE 8.4% 24.8% 0.163
Note: U.S. consumption tax data is from Vertex Inc. (2002). Column (2) reports the maximum marginal rate in the country.
Column (3) reports the Earnings level where the maximum marginal rate becomes effective. Column (4) reports the consumption
tax rate. Column (5) reports the average labor tax rate paid by the average worker in the country. Column (6) is the progressivity
wedge for singles between 50% and 200% of AE. AE represents average earnings.
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Table H.11: Contribution of Demographic Groups to the Difference in Annual Hours Worked with the U.S.
Country
Young Prime-Aged Old
Men Women Men Women Men Women
Married Single Married Single Married Single Married Single Married Single Married Single
Nordic
Norway 1.6 -5.6 1.9 -0.0 38.6 11.7 21.9 22.7 1.8 0.9 1.4 3.1
Finland 0.8 -8.4 2.6 -1.7 42.6 14.1 -9.2 22.1 19.0 5.6 6.1 6.6
Denmark 2.8 -23.1 -1.6 -9.5 50.9 18.4 6.8 29.8 10.8 2.5 5.8 6.4
Sweden 2.9 -0.1 2.6 2.5 51.5 11.4 -3.8 26.2 6.3 0.9 -2.7 2.4
Central
Austria 0.8 -16.6 1.1 -9.9 29.3 3.4 37.5 12.4 17.0 2.8 13.6 8.6
Belgium 1.0 3.4 0.0 4.9 23.5 7.5 22.6 12.8 10.0 2.1 7.6 4.4
Netherlands 0.8 -3.1 0.3 -1.1 20.5 3.2 41.0 15.9 7.6 1.8 8.0 4.9
Germany 1.0 -1.1 1.1 -1.6 29.5 11.2 28.7 11.7 8.1 1.6 6.2 3.7
Switzerland -0.8 -65.6 -7.9 -64.3 30.2 -23.5 208.6 -3.9 -6.5 -8.5 30.2 12.1
France 1.2 4.2 0.7 5.5 23.6 8.3 19.0 13.8 11.4 2.2 6.3 3.9
Luxembourg -0.1 4.0 0.4 5.7 17.6 0.8 37.6 5.4 12.5 1.7 9.7 4.8
UK 0.6 -19.8 0.3 -11.8 20.2 0.8 43.9 33.1 8.0 2.2 12.5 9.8
South
Spain 0.4 -1.0 0.8 3.5 19.2 9.0 36.5 14.3 4.9 1.0 7.4 4.0
Greece -1.2 -3.5 1.9 7.8 2.2 -3.8 48.2 21.0 5.3 1.3 10.5 10.2
Ireland 1.9 -10.5 0.5 -2.8 19.6 1.9 54.3 16.0 1.6 0.5 10.8 6.1
Italy 1.2 2.4 1.4 4.8 13.2 6.8 32.3 14.9 8.6 1.6 7.8 4.9
Portugal -0.8 -16.5 -2.7 2.4 40.6 18.5 11.0 20.4 8.4 2.6 8.5 7.7
Mean (weighted): 0.9 -4.2 0.7 0.3 25.5 7.1 30.2 16.0 8.7 1.8 7.8 5.3
Mean (Nordic): 1.9 -9.0 1.4 -2.0 44.9 13.7 5.5 24.8 9.1 2.5 2.7 4.6
Mean (Central): 0.8 -2.7 0.4 -0.6 23.8 5.4 33.8 13.1 10.2 1.8 8.8 5.2
Mean (South): 0.6 -4.0 0.7 3.1 17.9 6.5 37.2 16.4 5.8 1.3 8.7 5.9
Note: This table reports additional details regarding the contributions of various demographic groups to the difference between aggregate labor supply in the U.S. and the European
countries in our sample. Each column captures the differences in hours worked by various demographic groups in the two countries, assuming that the composition of the population in
these two countries is the same. The data is divided into 12 demographic groups, according to gender, marital status and age (using three age groups). All columns in each row add up to
100%.
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Table H.12: The Impact of Marriage Stability and Taxation on the Intensive and Extensive Margin
Country Extensive Margin Intensive MarginData Divorce Tax Data Divorce Tax
Nordic countries
Denmark 83.5 99.9 81.3 82.3 100.6 90.9
Finnland 85.5 101.4 103.8 81.3 101.0 89.4
Norway 80.6 99.6 100.4 81.7 100.6 91.9
Sweden 87.4 103.1 95.8 83.7 101.7 92.1
Mean: 84.3 101.0 95.4 82.3 101.0 91.1
Central Europe
Austria 79.4 100.5 101.4 84.6 100.6 94.0
Belgium 68.4 96.9 88.9 73.9 99.4 90.4
Netherlands 73.5 97.8 103.7 85.4 99.9 92.3
Germany 67.9 97.3 86.1 71.3 99.7 97.4
Switzerland 91.3 98.5 99.6 101.3 100.1 100.4
France 72.4 99.1 97.4 75.0 100.4 97.4
Luxembourg 75.9 96.9 99.8 85.1 99.4 97.4
UK 87.3 98.5 107.4 94.5 100.1 95.3
Mean: 77.0 98.2 98.1 83.9 99.9 95.6
Southern Europe
Greece 86.5 94.2 109.9 97.3 98.7 95.3
Ireland 82.9 97.9 101.0 93.0 100.3 96.9
Italy 72.0 94.1 106.3 82.3 98.9 92.8
Portugal 87.3 95.5 103.1 88.9 99.0 98.1
Spain 72.0 96.0 111.7 99.8 99.6 96.1
Mean: 80.1 95.5 106.4 92.3 99.3 95.9
Mean: 79.6 98.1 99.9 86.0 100.0 94.6
Corr(data, model) 0.705 -0.315 -0.455 0.201
Note: The table reports the impact of Marriage Stability and Taxation on the intensive and extensive margin. Numbers displayed
are hours worked as percentage of U.S. hours.
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Table H.13: Calibration Parameters
Panel A: Parameters Calibrated Outside the Model
Parameter Value Description Target
r 0.011 Risk free interest rate (annual) 3-mnth T-bill minus inflation (1947-2008)
e 1.0 or 1.7 UM(c, nm, n f ) = log(c
e
) − χm n
1+ηm
m
1+ηm OECD equivalence scale.
1/ηm, 1/η f 0.3, 0.6 −χ f
n
1+η f
f
1+η f
− FmI{nm} − F f I{n f } Kimmel and Kniesner (1998)
Γ(t) Varies Death probabilities NCHS (1991-2001)
Fraction w. some college 0.533 CPS (1999-2001)
ω¯intra ed. 0.737 Prob. of intra ed. marriage CPS (1999-2001)
k0 8260 Savings at age 20 NLSY97
Government budget, Transfers and Social Insurance
T $8400 Income if not working CEX 2000-2001
Ψm, Ψ f $12600, $9680 Social security S.S. Admin. (2000)
ϑ 0.76 Government budget, Eq. 8 Government budget (2000)
Marriage and Divorce
ω¯(t) Varies Prob. of marriage CPS (1999-2001)
π(t) Varies Prob of divorce
M0 0.126 Share of married 20 year-olds
Taxes
θ0, θ1 0.734, 0.112 Tax function, single, Eq. D.1 OECD tax data (2001)
s1, θ
jnt
0 , θ
jnt
1 1.000, 0.786, 0.133 Tax function, married, Eq. D.2
θ
sep
0 , θ
sep
1 0.473, -0.014
τc 0.084 Consumption tax Vertex Inc. (2002)
τk 0.36 Capital tax Trabandt and Uhlig (2011)
Wage and Earnings Shock
γ1hsm, γ2hsm, γ3hsm 0.0533, -0.0146, 0.000142 whsm = e(γ0hsm+γ1hsm x+γ2hsm x
2+γ3hsm x3) PSID (1968-1997)
γ1cm, γ2cm, γ3cm 0.0721, -0.0209, 0.000214 wcm = e(γ0cm+γ1cm x+γ2cm x
2+γ3cm x3)
γ1hs f , γ2hs f , γ3hs f 0.0556, -0.0165, 0.000161 whs f = e(γ0hs f +γ1hs f x+γ2hs f x
2+γ3hs f x3)
γ1c f , γ2c f , γ3c f 0.0714, -0.0204, 0.000185 wc f = e(γ0c f +γ1c f x+γ2c f x
2+γ3c f x3)
σhsm, σcm, σhs f , σc f 0.326, 0.337, 0.333, 0.347 u′ = ρ jgu + ǫ
ρhsm, ρcm, ρhs f , ρc f 0.761, 0.735, 0.717, 0.743 ǫ ∼ N(0, σ2jg)
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Panel B: Parameters Calibrated Endogenously
Parameter Value Description Moment Moment Value
γ0hsm -0.656 whsm = e(γ0hsm+γ1hsm x+γ2hsm x
2+γ3hsm x3) Mean male hs-wages 1.006
γ0cm -0.393 wcm = e(γ0cm+γ1cm x+γ2cm x
2+γ3cm x3) Mean male c-wages 1.493
γ0hs f -1.004 whs f = e(γ0hs f +γ1hs f x+γ2hs f x
2+γ3hs f x3) Mean female hs-wages 0.705
γ0c f -0.739 wc f = e(γ0c f+γ1c f x+γ2c f x
2+γ3c f x3) Mean female c-wages 1.043
β 1.002 Discount factor Mean assets 1.200
Fm 0.319 UM(c, nm, n f ) = log(c
e
) − χm n
1+ηm
m
1+ηm Male employment rate 0.840
F f 0.021 −χ f
n
1+η f
f
1+η f − FmI{nm} − F f I{n f } Female employment rate 0.706
χm 46.48 Male hours 0.328
χ f 12.70 Female hours 0.224
Note: The table reports the values of the calibrated parameters in our model and the target moments from the U.S. data. We try
to use data from 2000 or the year closest to 2000 that we can obtain. The reason for this is that for the year 2000, we have data
that can be used to construct divorce and marriage probabilities for all the countries in Western Europe. We also have tax data
for all the countries starting in 2001. Panel A reports the set of parameters that are calibrated to direct empirical counterparts
without solving the model. Parameters in Panel B are calibrated to match data moments written against them. We use the data
from the European countries in our sample only to obtain the estimates of tax polynomials and age-specific marriage and divorce
probabilities, which we use in Section 6 in our counterfactual experiments.
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Table H.14: Annual hours and contribution to total difference in annual hours by women with and without small
children (age 6 and less)
Panel A: Annual hours worked by women
No small children With small children Share with
Hrs %(U.S.) Hrs %(U.S.) small child, %
Austria 1205.7 100.3 536.5 57.1 31.7
Belgium 890.2 74.0 704.1 74.9 28.6
France 849.4 70.7 599.8 63.8 28.8
Germany 996.3 82.9 349.5 37.2 23.7
Greece 951.6 79.2 690.8 73.5 22.3
Ireland 1215.1 101.1 710.6 75.6 24.1
Italy 824.5 68.6 504.3 53.6 17.6
Luxembourg 1050.4 87.4 642.1 68.3 34.2
Netherlands 1162.3 96.7 396.6 42.2 25.1
Portugal 1046.6 87.1 1135.5 120.8 29.4
Spain 823.0 68.5 584.3 62.1 14.5
UK 1398.7 116.3 534.3 56.8 35.4
United States 1202.2 100.0 880.3 100.0 29.9
Panel B: Contribution of women to the overall difference in annual hours worked
Country Women, total:
Women with Women, no Prime-aged Prime-aged
small children small children women with women, no
small children small children
Austria 59.5 15.1 44.4 13.5 30.7
Belgium 52.1 5.0 47.2 3.8 31.0
Spain 66.5 8.3 58.2 7.1 43.4
Greece 97.3 7.0 90.3 4.2 65.7
Ireland 71.1 13.5 57.6 11.8 46.6
Italy 63.4 8.7 54.7 6.9 37.5
Netherlands 68.5 12.2 56.3 10.6 45.1
Germany 49.4 12.6 36.8 11.2 29.0
Portugal 52.6 -9.2 61.8 -10.1 45.0
France 42.8 6.1 36.7 4.5 23.1
Luxembourg 64.8 8.6 56.2 7.3 37.3
UK 79.4 26.4 53.0 22.5 47.3
Note: Panel A reports the annual hours worked by women with and without small children (age 6 and less). Panel B reports the
contribution of women to the overall difference in annual hours worked, with respect to the U.S., in percent. The table contains
only a subset of countries for which E.U. LFS provide information on children.
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